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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a premises liability case arising from Defendant's, Walter Amundson's 
("Amundson's·' or "Respondent's"), creation and knowledge of a dangerous condition on 
his property located at 756 West 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho 83634 ("the property"). Amundson 
purchased the property in 2007 and has utilized the property as a residential rental property 
ever since. (R. p. 114). Amundson's son, Roger Amundson ("Roger"), has been his 
father's tenant, since his father purchased the property in 2007. (R. p. 114). Amundson 
has always exercised authority and control over the property and has initiated, conducted, 
and/or supervised all repairs and renovations to the property. (R. pp. 116-117, 124-125). 
Amundson traveled to the property at least twice a month to perform repairs and 
maintenance and to collect monthly rent payments from his tenants, including Roger. (R. 
p. 116). 
Some time in June 2011, Amundson removed a large, four-foot by eight-foot, 200-
300-pound bay window from the property's garage. (R. pp. 117, 119). The window was 
eventually placed against a cedar fence in the house's adjacent walkway. (R. p. 116). 
When the window was placed in this location, it contained a shattered pane, which exposed 
a large, jagged blade of glass. (R. pp. 114-115). The window was supported by two small 
wooden slats, and precariously leaned against a cedar fence directly adjacent to a wooden 
stump in the property's walkway. See Affidavit ofC!ystal Stiles (R. pp. 118, 261-269). On 
July 8, 2011, Plaintifl: David Stiles ("Stiles" or "Appellant"), was a licensee on the 
prope1iy and was attending a social gathering in the backyard. As Stiles was exiting the 
property, he tripped on a wooden stump, in the middle of the side walkway egressing from 
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the baekyard of the property, and fell forward into the shattered windowpane. Stiles' left 
arm went through the shattered windowpane. catching the large blade or glass. and causing 
severe injuries. (R. pp. 195-196). 
Amundson, as owner or the property and the individual exercising authority and 
control over the premises, owed Stiles a duty to share his knowledge, whether actual or 
constructive, of dangerous conditions on the property, to competently make repairs to the 
property, including the removal and storage of the large bay window, and to exercise a duty 
of reasonable care in all respects relative to the bay window with the shattered pane of 
glass. (R. p. 10). Amundson breached his duties to Stiles, and, as a direct and proximate 
cause of Amundson's breaches of his duties, Stiles suffered severe injuries to his left arm. 
(R. pp. 216, 220, 221 ). 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
On July 3, 2013, Stiles filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against 
Amundson. (R. p. 6). Prior to Amundson filing an Answer, Stiles filed Plaintiff's First 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. (R. p. 12). Stiles alleged that Amundson 
owed Stiles a duty to share his knowledge of dangerous conditions and dangerous activities 
on his property, that Amundson breached that duty, and as a direct, actual and proximate 
result of Amundson's breach, Stiles suffered significant injuries. (R. p. 10). 
Amundson answered Stiles' complaint on October 24, 2013. Amundson raised a 
number of defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
comparative fault, that Amundson is not a real party in interest, superseding/intervening 
cause, failure to mitigate, estoppel, third-party negligence and failure to join an 
indispensable party. (R. pp. 19-22). During discovery, there were a number of depositions 
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taken. Plaintiffs counsel deposed Amundson and Roger (R. p. 110, 134). Defense counsel 
Stile, and Roger's former roommates, Sullivan and Jenkins. (R. pp. 180, 
On January 20, 2015, Amundson filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting 
memorandum, and the Affidavit of Walter Amundson in Support of Defendant's Motion.for 
Summaty Judgment. (R. p. 24-45). Amundson argued that he was not in control of the 
premises, that he did not owe Stiles a duty of care, and that, even if Amundson owed Stiles 
a duty of care, Amundson did not have knowledge of the dangerous condition. (R. p. 32-
38). Stiles opposed the dispositive motion with a memorandum of points and authorities. 
(R. pp. 270-288). Stiles argued that Amundson owed him a duty of reasonable care, a duty 
to warn of any dangerous condition existing on the property of which he knew or should 
have known upon reasonable inquiry and inspection, and that Amundson breached those 
duties to Stiles. Id 
The District Court ruled from the bench in granting Amundson's dispositive 
motion, thus the Court's decision is contained in the court reporter's transcript. (Tr. 1-42). 
In its ruling the Court held: "Well he (Amundson) doesn't have a duty- - maybe I'm wrong, 
but I got to tell you, I don't think that Stephens versus Stearns applies. That's between a 
landlord and a tenant, and the tenant is an invitee. And that's the duty to maintain a 
reasonably safe premises." (Tr. p. 21 ). The District Court further held, " ... [W]ell I don't 
think under the Robinson case, that the landlord has a duty to the licensee." (Tr. p. 38). 
"Now, the landlord here had a duty to repair, and, in fact, there might be a duty there. But 
the injury here did not arise from the repairs. The injury here had nothing to do with -other 
than it provided the source of the broken window. The repair or modification to the 
premises didn't really have anything to do with it." (Tr. p. 40). Finally, the Court stated, 
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''It is unfortunate that this injury happened, but I am constrained. I am a trial judge. I am 
constramed to follow the law in Idaho, and I do not believe you can make a -what's the 
word I'm looking for? - a distinction, a meaningful distinction, between Robinson and this 
case. If ifs wrong, it's up to the people up the street [ at 451 W. State Street in Boise] to 
change it because I don't get the privilege of deciding is should be that way. I have the 
privilege of following the cases as they come to me from the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court." (Tr. p. 41). 
C. Statement of Facts 
Since purchase in 2007, Amundson has utilized the property as a residential rental 
unit. (R. p. 114 ). At the time of the accident, there were three tenants residing at the 
property: Amundson's son, Roger, and Roger's roommates Jenkins and Sullivan (R. pp. 
116). There is no dispute that Amundson has exercised complete authority and control 
over the prope1iy since purchase in 2007. Amundson maintained the property, performing 
all necessary maintenance and repairs, and occasionally supervising maintenance and 
repairs, if Roger or another tenant were present and willing to assist with a task. All 
decisions regarding maintenance or projects on the property were at the sole discretion of 
Amundson and wholly for Amundson's benefit as owner of the property. (R. pp. 114, 124-
125). Additionally, Amundson's tenants acted as his agents, and any maintenance or 
upkeep to the property performed by the tenants was at Amundson's direction, sole 
discretion, and for Amundson's direct benefit. (R. p. 125). Whenever Roger performed 
any maintenance or upkeep on the property, he did so for and on behalf of his father., 
Respondent Amundson. (R. p. 70-71). 
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Amundson traveled to the property at least twice monthly to perform maintenance 
on property. complete repair and renovation projects, and collect rent payments. (R. p. 
16). One such project initiated and conducted by Amundson was the removal and storage 
of the large bay window that ultimately caused Stiles' injuries. (R. p. 118). Since purchase 
in 2007 Amundson has managed the property directly and never hired an independent 
property manager. Amundson stated in his affidavit, " ... [I]f there were any repairs or 
maintenance which was needed with respect to the property, I undertook the responsibility 
pursuant to the lease agreements with the tenants to conduct such repairs and maintenance." 
(R. p. 46). 
Amundson testified that he was aware social gatherings occurring on the premises, 
which involved alcohol. (R. p. 4 7, 117). Amundson further testified that he was informed 
of these gatherings by his son, Roger, and another leasehhold tenant, Jenkins. (R. p. 117). 
However, Roger and Jenkins both testified they never informed Amundson that these social 
gatherings occurred. (R. p. 70, 211 ). The social gatherings were held in the backyard and 
typically centered around a bonfire in the backyard's fire-pit. The gatherings were 
generally conducted by Sullivan, the third leasehold tenant on the property during the 
relevant time. (R. p. 193, 195). Roger testified that he typically did not attend the social 
gatherings in the backyard. (R. p. 150). Jenkins testified that he attended one or two. (R. 
p. 23 7). Sullivan testified however that both Roger and Jenkins would come out every 
once and awhile and hang out by the fire. (R. p. 197). Additionally, Stiles testified that, 
on the date of the accident, both Roger and Jenkins attended the gathering in the backyard. 
Stiles further testified that the date ofloss was the first time he had met Roger and Jenkins. 
(R.p.218). 
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The large, bay window which ultimately caused Stiles' injuries was removed from 
garage located on the property in mid-June 11. It was Amundson's idea to remove 
the window. (R. p. 117). The window was removed in order to install a garage door. 
Amundson was in charge of the project, and Roger assisted. (R. p. 117). Both Amundson 
and Sullivan testified that Sullivan assisted with the installation of the garage door, once 
the window was removed. (R. pp. 117, 189). Roger, however, testified that Sullivan did 
not participate in any part of the project. (R. p. 139). The large, bay window weighed 
between 200 and 300 pounds and was 4' x 8' in dimension. (R. p. 119). Upon removal, 
the window was stored toward the front of the property's walkway, and leaned up against 
a white vinyl fence. Amundson testified that since the window was "pretty heavy," that it 
was set down fairly soon next to the fence. (R. p. 118). Amundson then placed the window 
for sale on Craigslist for $200.00. (R. p. 118). 
At some point after the window was placed in this initial location, one of the 
window panes was shattered. According to Jenkins, approximately one week before the 
date of the accident on July 8, 2011, a gust of wind blew the window over, the window 
landed on his pickup, which was parked in the driveway on the property, and a pane of 
glass was shattered by the pickup's side rear-view mirror. (R. p. 244-245). According to 
Roger, Wayne opened his vehicle's door, and the door struck the window, shattering the 
glass pane. (R. pp. 116, 118-119). Within 48 hours of the window being shattered, the 
window was moved into the walkway area toward the backyard, between the garage and a 
cedar fence separating the adjoining property, near the walkway's gate to the backyard, 
and leaned up against the cedar fence on the eastside of the walkway which had a gravel 
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pathway. (R.p.140.142-143). Rogertestifiedthathemovedtheheavy,largebaywindow 
20 feet into walkway by himself. (R. p. 140). 
The window sat at its final location leaning against the cedar fence, with the broken 
pane of glass, for a long period of time before the date of the accident. (R. p. 142). This 
amount of time most likely would have been between two and four weeks. Sullivan 
testified the window was stored against the cedar fence for approximately two weeks prior 
to the accident. (R. pp. 192-193). At deposition, Jenkins initially testified that Amundson 
and Roger had moved the window. (R. p. 186). Jenkins later changed his testimony and 
testified that if he remembered correctly, it was Roger who moved the window. (R. p. 
186). Both Roger and Jenkins testified that, when the window was moved, the pane of 
glass was already shattered. (R. pp. 117,234). When the window was moved further into 
the walkway, and placed against the cedar fence by the gate to the backyard, the wooden 
stump on which Stiles tripped was in the walkway area. (R. pp. 158, 160, 264). Roger 
moved the window from the driveway, and further back into the walkway area, because he 
was worried about the window being further damaged by Jenkins. (R. p. 120). When 
Roger moved the window, he was not concerned about anyone being injured by the 
window. (R. p. 120). 
Roger testified that he should have removed the shattered glass from the window 
as soon as the window panel was shattered, and there would not have been a hazard existing 
on the property. (R. p. 145). Roger also testified that the stump presented a tripping hazard, 
and both the tripping hazard, and the hazard presented by the shattered window pane could 
have been eliminated. (R. p. 160). Of course, it is undisputed that Stiles tripped on the 
stump which should have been removed and then severely lacerated his left arm, after 
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tripping, on the broken pane of glass in the large, bay window located in the walkway from 
backyard and leaning up against the cedar fence. 
Immediately prior to the accident, on either July 5 or 6, 2011, \vhich was only two 
or three days prior to the date of the accident, Amundson traveled to the property to collect 
rent payments from his tenants. At deposition, Amundson was able to initially recall this 
visit, since Sullivan usually was paid on the fifth day of each month. (R. p. 118). 
Amundson initially testified at deposition that, when he traveled to the property during the 
day on either July 5 or 6, 2011, he saw the window; Amundson therefore visited the 
property and saw the window either three or two days prior to the date of the accident. (R. 
p. 118). Amundson later testified in his deposition that he did not know, if he was at the 
property on June 5 or 6, 2011, or not. (R. p. 119). Even though Amundson initially testified 
at deposition that he saw the window shortly before the accident, Amundson states in his 
affidavit, " ... [P]rior to the accident, I was certainly not aware of the existence of a wooden 
stump or the bay window being relocated in that area at the time of the alleged accident." 
(R. p. 49). Regardless, there is ample evidence that, when Amundson visited the property 
two to three days prior to the accident, the windowpane was shattered, and the large, bay 
window was located in the walkway leaning up against the cedar fence." (R. pp. 118, 192-
193). 
Roger testified that on the night of the accident, the entire walkway was illuminated 
by a neighboring light, which existed on a giant pole extending skyward from the eave on 
the neighbor's barn and a separate light located on a telephone pole in front of the property. 
(R. pp. 24-25). Roger testified that he believed the neighbor's light was on at the time of 
the accident. (R. p. 26). The property on the other side of the cedar fence is owned by Dan 
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and Vicki Gearring. Dan Gearring ("'Gearring'') owned the property on the date of the 
Gearring states in his affidavit that there was never a light mounted on the pole, 
which exists on his barn; rather, a previous owner utilized the pole as a llagpole; Gearring 
further testifies in his affidavit that there has never been a light of any kind mounted 
anywhere on the flagpole, either prior to or since his purchase of the property, which 
overlaps with the date of the accident. (R. p. 258). In turn, there is ample evidence that 
the lighting of the walkway, where the stump and bay window were located on the date of 
loss, was inadequate for an ingress/egress of the property during nighttime hours. 
In the morning hours of July 8, 2011, Stiles was attending a social gathering at the 
property. (R. p. 214). Sullivan invited Stiles to the gathering, and Stiles attended. (R. p. 
214). When Stiles arrived, there were approximately eight to ten people gathered around 
a bonfire in the backyard. When Stiles arrived the garage door was open, and the light was 
on in the garage. (R. p. 217). Stiles entered the backyard through the open garage door, 
and was unaware of the shattered window in the walkway next to the garage. (R. p. 218). 
Stiles consumed one beer at the gathering, and had opened a second of which he consumed 
approximately one-third; Stiles later poured the rest of the second beer on the fire to 
extinguish the existing burning coals. (R. p. 218). There is no admissible evidence in the 
factual record whatsoever that Stiles was intoxicated or otherwise under the influence of 
any substance at the time of the accident. 
Attendees at the gathering dispersed, and eventually only Stiles, Sullivan and 
Sullivan's girlfriend remained. When Sullivan and his girlfriend went into the house, Stiles 
remained to make sure the fire was extinguished. (R. p. 219). Once Stiles had extinguished 
the fire, he exited the backyard through the back gate leading into the side walkway 
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between the garage and the cedar fence. (R. p. 218). Stiles proceeded to the garage to exit 
property, as he had entered, however the garage door was shut. Rather than exit through 
the house, during the early hours of the morning and possible wake folks. which at the time 
was occupied by two individuals he had just met, his cousin (Sullivan), and his cousin's 
girlfriend, Stiles opted to be polite, and exit through the walkway. (R. p. 220). Stiles 
opened the gate to the walkway, entered the walkway and turned around to close the gate. 
It was dark. Stiles could not get the gate to latch behind him, so he pulled the gate as far 
shut as he could. Stiles then turned around to proceed down the walkway, tripped over the 
stump, and, as he reached out to brace himself he fell into the window. Stiles' left arm 
went through the broken pane of glass and was cut by the large-blade shard. Stiles suffered 
a severe laceration cutting muscle, ligament, and tendon and could hear the blood squirting 
from his arm. Stiles described the sound the squirting blood made as "pfst, pfst." (R. p. 
220). It was a severe injury. There was blood squirting everywhere, hitting Stiles in the 
face, drenching his socks, and filling his shoes. (R. p. 220). During the fall, Stiles did not 
break any additional glass from the windowpane. (R. p. 220). After the accident, Stiles 
was transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. (R. p. 224). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Respondent on Appellant's premises liability claim in that Respondent 
owed Appellant a duty of ordinary and reasonable care under the facts of 
this case. 
B. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Respondent on Appellant's claim that Respondent owed Appellant a duty 
to warn of any dangerous conditions existing on Respondent's property of 
which Respondent knew or should have known upon a reasonable inquiry, 
inspection, investigation, and/or examination. 
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C. Whether Respondent's status as property owner and/or property manager of 
the premises created a duty to warn Appellant a dangerous condition 
existing on the date of loss. 
D. Whether Respondent's status as the individual with control over the 
premises created a duty to warn of any dangerous conditions existing on 
Respondent's property of which Respondent knew or should have known 
upon a reasonable inquiry, inspection, investigation and/or examination. 
E. Whether Respondent should be liable to Appellant for the claim of negligent 
repair of a leased, residential premises and whether summary judgment 
should have been denied, alternatively and/or additionally, on this basis. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) is proper if the 
"pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "In an appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the 
district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment." Partout v. Harper, 145 
Idaho 683,685, 183 P.3d 771, 773 (2008). Cumis Ins. Socy, Inc. v. A1assey, 155 Idaho 
942, 945, 318 P.3d 932, 935 (2014). Thus, this Court freely reviews a District Court's 
summary judgment ruling. "On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a 
genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw." Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P. 3d 497, 501 (Ct.App.2015) 
citing Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct.App.1986). 
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"The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw." Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404,848 P.2d 984,988 (Ct.App.1992). 
"When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion." G & iv! Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co .. 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint 
School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App. 1994). "In a case that would 
otherwise be decided by a jury, the trial court is not free to arrive at the most probable 
inferences that may be drawn, but is compelled to draw all inferences in favor of the non-
moving party." Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844, 846, 55 P.3d 298, 300 
(2002). "However the party responding to summary judgment is not required to present 
evidence on every element of his or her case at the time of summary judgment. Instead, 
the non-moving party need only establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion." See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. 
Agency, 126 Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). 
Summary judgment must be denied "if the evidence 1s such that conflicting 
inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different 
conclusions." Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
.JUDGMENT TO AMUNDSON, BECAUSE AMUNDSON OWED STILES A 
DUTY OF ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE AND BREACHED THAT DUTY. 
1. The existence of a legal duty can be a mixed question of law and fact. 
While oftentimes the determination of whether a duty exists is a legal question, 
there are times, such as in the case at bar, where it is a mixed question oflaw and fact. As 
this Court has opined previously: 
In the pre-trial order it is also stated: 'The contested issues 
of fact are the position, course and speed of the vehicles 
immediately prior to and at the time of the collision.' 
Immediately following that statement appeared the so-called 
issues of law, set out above. Even though they may have 
been denominated as 'issues oflaw,' in truth such issues are 
questions of mixed law and fact, inasmuch as the issues of 
negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause 
(mentioned in Sub. A), and issues of agency, master-servant 
relationship and scope of duty or employment (mentioned in 
Sub. B), are normally issues to be submitted to the jury for 
resolution. That this is the viewpoint of the trial court and 
the respective parties is evidenced by the general verdicts 
submitted, the instructions requested by the respective 
parties and the instructions given by the court, none of which 
limited the factual issues to 'position, course and speed of 
the vehicles immediately prior to and at the time of the 
impact and collision.' It is our conclusion that there was no 
waiver of jury trial by the appellant on the issue of agency 
and scope of employment by reason of the pre-trial order. 
Van Vranken v. Fence-Crafi, 91 Idaho 742,745,430 P.2d 488,491 (1967). In the case at 
bar, in light of the facts presented particularly that Amundson was on the subject property 
two or three days prior to date of loss, Stiles submits that the legal duty owed by Amundson 
could not be decided as a matter of law due to the inextricably-intertwined facts of what 
Amundson saw and appreciated as dangerous on the property. A very fair interpretation 
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the facts is that Amundson must have seen, or at least should have seen, the bay window 
broken pane of glass leaning against the back fence, in the location where it caused 
injuries to Stiles, when Amundson was collecting rent payments t\vo or three days prior to 
the date of loss. 
2. Amundson acted negligently in causing Plaintifrs injuries. 
The requirements to prove negligence in Idaho arc familiar. Negligence requires: 
(]) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the resulting injuries; and ( 4) actual loss or damage. Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 
Idaho 443, 445, 337 P.3d 602, 604 (2014). See, also, Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 
Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995). 
As provided above, the District Court ruled that Amundson did not owe Stiles a 
duty of reasonable and ordinary care and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of 
Amundson. (Tr. p. 39-41 ). With regard to the duty of a landowner, Idaho has followed 
the traditional common law standard, which places land entrants into three fixed categories: 
invitees, licensees, and trespassers. These three categories, " ... [M]ake out, as a general 
pattern, a rough sliding scale, by which, as the legal status of the visitor improves, the 
possessor of the land owes him more of an obligation of protection." Prosser, TORTS ( 4th 
ed.) §58, p. 357. These categories were developed in English common law at a time when 
the law attached supreme importance to a landowner's property interests. See Bohlen, F(fiy 
Years of Torts, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 725. "The feudal conception that the landowner was a 
sovereign within his own boundaries provided the justification for a line of decisions that 
predicated the existence and distinguished the degree of a landowner's liability for injuries 
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occurring on his land on the type of relationship existing between the landowner and the 
mj urcd party. v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693,695,297 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1973). 
Under the common law approach, a land owner's duty to persons entering his land 
is dependent upon the entrant's status as an invitee, licensee or trespasser." See Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, "the law has imposed varying duties, depending upon the nature of the visit 
and the entrants' expectations of what they will encounter on the property." Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, 107 Idaho 593,595,691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984). ''The distinction between 
trespassers, licensees and invitees is the controlling test in determining the scope and extent 
of the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants." See Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 
Idaho 299,612 P.2d 142 (1980). 
Idaho's appellate courts have adopted the traditional entrant classifications, and 
prescribed the attendant landowner duties. "An invitee is one who enters upon the premises 
of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it 
can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary, or other 
tangible benefit to the landowner." Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 
P.2d 814,817 (1994). "A landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers." Id. 
"A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of 
the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose." Id.; Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 
732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987). "Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee." 
Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400,871 P.2d at 817. "A landowner is only required to share 
with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." Evans, 112 
Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. Finally, "a landowner's duty to a trespasser is to refrain 
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from willful or wanton acts which might cause injury." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 
7, 960P.2d 1266, l269(1998)(citingHuyck, 101 Idahoat301,612P.2dat I 
Stiles respectfully submits that in 1984 this Court left behind the arcane common 
law analysis which limited a landlord's liability, and adopted a modem approach, ruling 
that "a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances." 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258 267 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). This approach was a 
deviation from the traditional common law "tripartite" approach. In Stephens this com1 
ruled that a landlords duty is one of 'reasonable care in light of all the circumstances.' This 
Court ruled, " ... [W]e believe that the energies of the courts of Idaho should be used in a 
more productive manner. Therefore, after examining both the common-law rule and the 
modern trend, we today decide to leave the common law rule and its exceptions behind, 
and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light 
of all the circumstances." Id. at 256. 
In so ruling, this Court addressed a national trend, which sought to abrogate the 
common law, tripartite, premises liability analysis. Perhaps more importantly, the Court 
cited policy reasons for the new standard, primarily judicial economy. "While continuing 
to pay lip service to the general rule, the courts have expended considerable energy and 
exercised great ingenuity in attempting to fit various factual settings into the recognized 
exceptions." Stephens citing Restatement (Second) of Property-Landlord and Tenant ch. 
17 Reporter's Note to Introductory Note (1977). Simply put, applying the standard of 
reasonable care to landlords relieves courts and litigants from the belaboring task of 
pigeonholing each property entrant in each case into a specific class. 
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Other jurisdictions have followed in this vein by abrogating the traditional common 
liability standard: "A landlord owes the same duties to persons lawfully upon 
leased premises as the landlord owes to the tenant." Shwnp v. First Cont'l-Robinwood 
Assoc., 644 N.E.2d 291, 296-97 (Ohio App. 1994). 
Minnesota has abolished the distinctions between invitees and licensees, in favor 
of a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. The Minnesota appellate case of 
Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972), abolished the common-law distinction 
between the duty owed by a landowner to a licensee as opposed to an invitee. "In Peterson 
we held that the test to be applied in determining the extent of a landowner's duty is that of 
reasonable care under the existing circumstances." Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 179 
(Minn. 1979). 
In Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1979), a 
residential tenant's invitee or guest was injured when he leaned against a porch railing 
which broke, allowing him to fall some distance to a lower level. A jury found that the 
landlord had no prior knowledge of the rotten condition of the rail, and judgment was 
entered for the defendant landlord. The Court ruled: 
We believe, however, that the better public policy lies in the abandonment 
of the general rule of nonliability and the adoption of a rule that a landlord 
is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the 
premises." And further that questions of control, hidden defects, and 
common use would be relevant only as bearing on the general determination 
of negligence, including foreseeability and unreasonableness of the risk of 
harm. Id. at 59. 
Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162,402 N.E.2d l 045 (1980), was factually similar 
to Pagelsdorf In Young the injured plaintiff, a guest of the tenant, appealed from a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant landlord. The Supreme Court of 
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Massachusetts, on its own motion, brought the case up from the intermediate court. Noting 
Id 
of the law that to the rule of immunity, the court stated: 
Today. we do away with the ancient law that bars a tenant's guest from 
recovering compensation from a landlord for injuries caused by negligent 
maintenance of areas rented to the tenant. Like the other rules based on 
status, this rule has prevented a whole class of people from raising the 
overriding issue: whether the landlord acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. The practical result of this archaic rule has been to 
discourage repairs of rented premises. 
Notwithstanding the guidance provided by this Court in Stephens, which was based 
on the above referenced national trend, in the case at bar the District Court refused to apply 
the standard of ordinary and reasonable care in light of the circumstances. 
3. Stephens extended a landlord's duty of reasonable care to social 
guests and licensees. 
At summary judgment, the trial judge ruled "I don't think that Stephens versus 
Stearns applies. That's between a landlord and a tenant, and the tenant is an invitee." (Tr. 
p. 21 ). A close review of the Stephens decision supports a different conclusion. There is 
no indication in the Stephens opinion that this Court limited the duty of reasonable care 
owed from a landlord to tenants only. In Stephens this Court ruled, "henceforth, landlords 
as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk 
of harm. A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances 
including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and 
the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited 
a New Hampshire case, which held: 
We thus bring up to date the other half of landlord-tenant 
law. Henceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise 
reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk 
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of harm .... A landlord must act as a reasonable person under 
oil o/the circumstances including the likelihood cf injury to 
the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the 
burden ofreducing or avoiding the Emphasis added. 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984)(citing Sargent v. Ross, 
308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973)). 
This quote from Sargent does not specify tenants as the only group of entrants owed 
the reasonable person standard. Furthermore, the underlying facts of Sargeant, relied upon 
by this Court in support of the Stephens decision to prove that the Stephens ruling was 
intended to extend to social guests and/or licensees, are important to the analysis of the 
case at bar. The salient facts of Sargeant are as follows: 
Id. at 529. 
The question in this case is whether the defendant landlord 
is liable to the plaintiff in tort for the death of plaintiffs four-
year-old daughter who fell to her death from an outdoor 
stairway at a residential building owned by the defendant in 
Nashua. The defendant resided in a ground-floor apartment 
in the building, and her son and daughter-in-law occupied a 
second story apartment serviced by the stairway from which 
the child fell. At the time of the accident the child was under 
the care of the defendant's daughter-in-law who was 
plaintiffs regular baby-sitter. 
The child in Sargeant was a licensee with permission to be in the apartment while 
defendant's daughter-in-law babysat her. In upholding the jury verdict against the 
landlord, the Sargeant Court ultimately ruled that the landlord's duty of reasonable care 
extended to the non-invitee child. 
Both plaintiff and the wife tenant testified that the stairs were 
too steep, and the husband tenant testified that his wife 
complained to him of this fact. While the defendant landlord 
did not testify, the jury could find that she knew that this 
steep stairway was frequently used by the young children for 
whom her daughter-in-law was the regular, daily babysitter. 
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In any event the use of these steps by young children should 
have been anticipated by the defendant. 
The facts of Sargeant are similar to the facts in the case at bar. Both cases involved 
a dangerous defect or condition existing on a residential rental property, a landlord's 
knowledge that licensees would travel on or passed by this defect and a traumatic injury 
or death resulting from the existence of the defect. The Sargeant decision was a critical 
basis for this Court's ruling in Stephens, which established in Idaho that landlords owe 
tenants, licensees, and social guests an ordinary and reasonable duty of care in light of all 
the circumstances. Additionally, since the 1984 Stephens ruling, Justices Bistline and 
Huntley authored concurring opinions in Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867,872, 749 P.2d 
486, 491 (1988) which stated: 
In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, we held that the measure of a 
landlord's duty to its tenant is not determined under 
trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis, but rather, "A landlord 
must act as a reasonable person under all of the 
circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, 
the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of 
reducing or avoiding the risk." Id., at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, 
quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 NTL 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 
(1973). The landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care in 
light of all the circumstances extends to his or her tenant or 
anyone on the premises with the tenant's consent. 
Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis.2d 734, 
284 N.W. 2d 55, 61 (1979). The trial court's reliance upon 
the traditional law pertaining to invitees was misplaced. The 
test is one of reasonableness under the circumstances, not 
one of hidden or obvious dangers, or exceptions to the 
traditional general rule of non-liability for landlords. As we 
have said before, there is no justification for this general 
cloak of common law immunity for landlords. Stephens v. 
Stearns, supra. See also Pageisdorf; supra. 
See also Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc .. 118 Idaho 297, 300-301, 769 P. 2d 506, 509-510 
(1990). Sharp concerned a commercial landlord-tenant relationship. The tenant was 
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assaulted and raped in her office by an intruder who allegedly gained access to the building 
an unlocked fire escape door. The district court granted summary judgment on the 
that the landlord owed Sharp no duty. This Court reversed and remanded. ruling in 
relevant part: 
Id. 
Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case 
is the general rule that each person has a duty of care to 
prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. 
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). 
Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care 
not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency 
set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services 
or use his property as to avoid such injury. (Citations 
omitted.) Whitt v. Jernigan, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P. 2d 
278, 285 (1966). Whether the duty attaches is largely a 
question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the 
risk. Sharp, supra. 
Based on the foregoing precedents, Stiles respectfully submits that the duty owed 
by Amundson does not depend on his status on the property as being only that of an invitee. 
Idaho law does not recognize a difference in the duty owed by a landlord to licensees and 
invitees. The duty owed by landlords to invitees and licensees alike should be to use due 
care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to both classes of persons, and the 
proper standard is one of ordinary and reasonable care in light of all the circumstances. 
Therefore, in the case subjudice, the District Court e1Ted in ruling as a matter of law that 
the Stephens case did not apply and that Amundson did not owe a duty of reasonable care 
to Stiles. 
Stiles anticipates that Amundson will argue to this Court, as he did below, that the 
Idaho Court of Appeals ruling in Robinson v. Mueller governs the facts of this case. (R. p. 
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36-37). The Robinson case involved a landlord who owned a two-story home and rented 
second level as an apartment to a tenant. The apartment's bedroom contained access 
out onto the roof to a small area, through a recessed dormer. A door opened to the dormer 
area, which was 11.5' x 7.5'. The dormer contained no railings. When the tenant moved 
in, the landlord specifically warned the tenant that the dormer did not contain railings. 
Robinson, the plaintiff, and the tenant met at a local bar. After two drinks, the couple went 
to the tenant's apartment. The tenant opened the door to the dormer to let in cool air and 
to enjoy the view. The tenant then went downstairs to retrieve an item from his car. During 
the tenant's absence, Robinson went through the doorway, and tripped and fell. Robinson 
rolled off the dormer onto the ground 12 feet below. As a result of the fall, Robinson broke 
her femur. Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237,322 P.3d 319 (Ct.App. 2014). 
In Robinson, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the landlord did not owe 
Robinson a duty to warn. Id. at 241 and 313. The Court held: 
Likewise, the landlord did not owe a duty to warn Robinson. 
There is no dispute that Robinson was a social guest inside 
the tenant's apartment. While the tenant may have had a duty 
to warn Robinson of the dangers of the dormer, the landlord 
did not share in this duty. The landlord's duty to warn 
existed with respect to the tenant due to the tenant's status as 
an invitee. However, because Robinson was a social guest, 
her status on the premises was that of a licensee. Thus, the 
landlord's duty did not extend to her. 
Id. In Robinson, the court also addressed the Stephens case and held: 
While Robinson relies upon Stephens, her reliance is 
misplaced. In that case, Stephens rented an apaiiment from 
Steams. The apartment had an interior stairwell without a 
handrail. Stephens tripped down this stairwell and suffered 
injuries. Stearns moved for directed verdict and the district 
court granted the motion, concluding Stearns had not 
violated the common-law duty owed by a landlord to a 
tenant-that a landlord is generally not liable to the tenant 
for any damage resulting from dangerous conditions existing 
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Id. 
at the time of the leasing. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme 
Court examined the modern trend at the time. which was to 
impose a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. 
The Court ultimately abandoned the common-law doctrine 
and adopted the rule that a landlord is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances. 
Thus, Stephens addressed the duty of a landlord as owed to 
invitees. While Robinson contends this case effectively 
abolished the general distinction of invitees, licensees, and 
trespassers in the context of residential rented properties, we 
do not read Stephens so broadly. Stephens specifically 
addressed the relationship of a landlord and tenant and its 
holding is limited to that precise context. See Stevens v. 
Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 525, 777 P.2d 1 l 96, 1198 (1989) 
("landlord is required to exercise reasonable care to his 
tenants in light of all the circumstances" ( emphasis added)). 
Stiles respectfully submits to this Court that the Idaho Court of Appeals erred in 
finding that Robinson was not owed a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. As 
previously mentioned, the cases this Court cited in Stephens and the Stephens opinion itself 
both establish that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to 
tenants as well as other entrants on the leased premises whether or not classified as invitees 
or licenses/social guests. This holding was further supported by the Court's decisions in 
1\1archer and Sharp, supra. Therefore the Court of Appeals decision in Robinson should 
not govern the facts of this case, and summary judgment in favor of Amundson was 
improper. The duty owed by Amundson to Stiles was one of reasonable care under the 
circumstances. The genuine questions of material fact surrounding whether that duty was 
breached, particularly in light of Amundson' s involvement in the removal and storage of 
the window as well as the fact he was on the property only two or three days prior to the 
accident when the window pane was already and shattered and the window placed in the 
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walkway area. should be submitted to a Jury. Summary adjudication was thus 
4. Under the proper standard of ordinary and reasonable care in light 
of all the circumstances, there are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether Amundson breached his duty to Stiles. 
While the Stephens case established that landlords owe a standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances to licensees, the Court was careful to point out the elements 
of negligence must still be proven to hold a landlord liable for premises liability. 
We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to making the landlord 
an insurer for all injury occurring on the premises, but merely constitutes 
our removal of the landlord's common-law cloak of immunity. Those 
questions of hidden danger, public use, control, and duty to repair, which 
under the common-law were prerequisites to the consideration of the 
landlord's negligence, will now be relevant only inasmuch as they pertain 
to the elements of negligence, such as foreseeability and unreasonableness 
of the risk. We hold that defendant Steams did owe a duty to plaintiff 
Stephens to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances, and 
that it is for a jury to decide whether that duty was breached. Therefore, we 
reverse the directed verdict in favor of defendant Steams and remand for a 
new trial of plaintiffs negligence action against defendant Steams. 
Emphasis added. 
Accordingly, in the case at bar, application of the proper standard ( ordinary and 
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances) would require that this case be presented 
to a jury, so the questions of fact surrounding foreseeability and unreasonableness of the 
risk could be properly addressed by a fact finder. Under the reasonable care standard, 
summary judgment was improper. As mentioned above, with the proper duty established, 
this case should go to a jury to decide whether Amundson breached that duty. 
5. Alternatively, if the Court decides the duty of ordinary and 
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances, as announced in 
Stephens, docs not apply from landlords to licensees and social 
guests, that standard should now be adopted by this Court. 
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This Court has ruled "there is no justification for this general cloak of common law 
landlords .. , Stephens and A1archer, supra: Harrison v. Taylor. 115 Idaho 
596, 768 P.2d 132 L 1329 (1989). The notion that landlords should benefit from 
common law immunity to entrants traces its roots to medieval England in a time and place, 
when the Crown owned all real property, and, under sovereign immunity, suits against the 
Crown were bmTed. Such is simply not the case in modern-day Idaho, particularly in this 
case, where it is undisputed that the property was privately-owned land wholly controlled 
and overseen by a landlord who did not reside on the premises. 
After the Norman Conquest, land was held by persons as "tenants" of William the 
Conqueror, who held title to all land in England. As the tenancy for years began to develop, 
mainly as a means to circumvent the church's prohibition against usury, the law regarded 
this kind of tenant's interest as contractual, and the tenant could not enforce his rights in 
real actions in the King's Courts. Real property law of the time decreed that a purchaser of 
real property took the property "as is" and, therefore, so did a lessee. This doctrine of 
"caveat emptor" or "caveat lessee" is described in the words of Coke: "Note that by the 
civil law every man is bound to warrant the thing that he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there 
be no express warranty either in deed or in law; but the common law bindeth him not, for 
caveat en,ptor." Love, supra, at 27-28 ( quoting 2 Coke, A commentary on Littleton I 02( a), 
C 7, § 145 (1853 ed)). 
Real property law of the time decreed that a purchaser of real property took the 
property "as is" and, therefore, so did a lessee. This doctrine of "caveat emptor" or "caveat 
lessee" is described in the words of Coke: "Just as did the grantee ofland, the lessee took 
the premises with whatever defects were present at the time of leasing, and the lessor had 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -- 30 
no responsibility to anyone to maintain the premises or repair them. and for want of this 
the lessor had an immunity against liability to anyone on the land who was injured by 
a defective condition of the premises." Love. supro. at 48. The common law came to accept 
and enforce this harsh rule, despite occasionally recognizing that it was at odds with other 
principles of the law. "[F]raud apart, there is no law against letting a tumbledown house." 
Robbins v. Jones, 143 Eng. Rep 768, 776 (1863) (Opinion of Chief Justice Erle). 1 
This Court, and others, have found it time to do away with the medieval concept 
that landowners should be treated as royalty, and benefit from a common law vestige of 
immunity. The reasonable person standard, and the negligence analysis of breach, 
causation and damages is a trusty and proven system to determine the existence, or non-
existence of negligence. The negligence standard can readily handle cases involving 
landlords, and licensees and social guests. The cases following the national trend, cited 
above support adoption of the reasonable person standard for landlords. 
The application of a standard of ordinary and reasonable care in light of the 
circumstances is also supported by the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which provides 
The lessor's duty under the rule stated in this Section is not 
merely contractual, although it is founded upon a contract. 
It is a tort duty. It extends to persons on the land with the 
consent of the lessee, with whom the lessor has made no 
contract. The lessor is not an insurer of the safety of the 
premises, and is not liable for harm caused even to his lessee 
by a failure to make the land absolutely safe. He is liable 
only if his failure to do so is due to a failure to exercise 
reasonable care to that end. 
1 In Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or. 630, 762 P.2d 997 ( 1988), the Oregon Supreme Court set forth in detail the 
history of premises liability, dating back to Medieval England, and the basis for establishing the modern trend 
of applying a duty of 'ordinary and reasonable care in light of all the circumstances' to landlords with regard 
to tenants, invitees and social guests. 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 357 (1965). 
Thus. application of the duty of ordinary and reasonable care in light 
circumstances to tenants/invitees as well as licensees/social guests will promote judicial 
economy and the policy goal of encouraging landlords to maintain their leased prope11ies 
in a satisfactory and safe condition. If this Court does not agree that the Stephens case has 
already announced that the standard of ordinary and reasonable care in light of the 
circumstances to invitees/tenants as well as licensees/ social guests, this standard should 
now be adopted by this Court. It is the fair standard to apply in these tort situations. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO AMUNDSON, BECAUSE AMUNDSON OWED STILES A 
DUTY TO WARN OF ANY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS EXISTING ON 
THE PROPERTY OF WHICH AMUNDSON EITHER KNEW OR SHOULD 
HA VE KNOvVN. 
If this Court declines to follow Stephens, and the national trend, which provide that 
Amundson owed Stiles a duty of ordinary and reasonable care in light of the circumstances, 
Amundson still breached his duty to Stiles under the traditional, common-law approach to 
premises liability. 
Notwithstanding the separate duty set forth in Stephens the duty owed to licensees 
in Idaho is a landowner is obligated to warn a licensee of known dangers. "A landowner 
is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities 
on the land." Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 401 732 P.2d 369 (Ct.App.1987). "A 
landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions 
or activities on the land." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals cieariy set forth the duty owed 
to licensees in Keller v. Holiday Inns: 
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A person who enters the property of another with passive 
permission or as a mere social guest traditionally has been 
held to understand that he must take the land as the possessor 
uses it. This entrant, classified by the law as a licensee, is 
expected to be alert and to protect himself from the risks he 
encounters. Accordingly, the duty owed to a licensee with 
respect to such risks is narrowly restricted. The possessor is 
required simply to share his knowledge of dangerous 
conditions or dangerous activities with the licensee. When 
such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is 
no longer superior to that of the licensee, and the possessor's 
duty extends no farther. 
Keller 105 Idaho 649 at 652. 
As stated in his deposition, and recognized by the trial court, Amundson failed to 
warn Stiles of a dangerous condition existing on the property. Accordingly, Amundson 
breached his duty to Stiles under the above-mentioned standard. As set forth above, if the 
duty owed by Amundson to Stiles is the licensee standard of sharing with the licensee 
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land, Amundson breached that duty. 
There are a number of disputed material facts surrounding this duty which preclude the 
district court's ruling in favor Amundson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
There is a disputed question of fact as to whether Amundson knew the window was 
shattered. Additionally, there is a disputed question of fact as to whether Amundson knew 
the window itself was shattered, and later moved further up the walkway. Nonetheless, 
Amundson testified at deposition that he exercised "complete authority and control over 
the property," including all maintenance and repairs performed on the property. Amundson 
also testified that he visited the property at least twice monthly to collect rent, and perform 
all necessary maintenance and repair. (R. pp. 125-126, 127, 117). 
Amundson also had a pecuniary interest in the window, so much so that he placed 
the window for sale on Craigslist. (R. p. 118). Additionally, at one point during his 
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deposition, Amundson testified that he visited the property either 48 or 72 hours before the 
during the day, and saw the P. 11 material issues 
exist surrounding Mr. Amundson's knowledge of the window. If Amundson had 
knowledge of the dangerous condition presented by window, even under the nanow 
licensee standard, Amundson had a duty to share this knowledge vvith Stiles. The existence 
of the abovementioned, disputed, material facts further precludes summary judgment. 
These questions of material fact should be submitted to a jury. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO AMUNDSON SINCE AMUNDSON WAS LIABLE TO 
STILES FOR THE NEGLIGENT REP AIR PERFORMED ON THE BAY 
WINDOW. 
In Idaho, when a landlord undertakes a repair, and fails to properly complete the 
repair, the landlord is responsible for any injury caused as a result. This Court has 
previously overruled a District Court decision granting a Motion for Summary Judgment 
in McKinley v. Fanning 100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979). In McKinley this Court 
ruled that factual issues existed precluding summary judgment when Plaintiff brought suit 
against landlord, and contractor, when plaintiff alleged her injuries were the result of 
contractor's negligent installation of an owning, and the landlord's negligent failure to 
correct the improper installation and to remedy the hazard it created. Id. at 189. McKinley 
involved an improperly installed awning, which was draining water onto an adjacent 
sidewalk, which subsequently froze and presented a hazard which eventually led to 
plaintiffs injuries. The duty of care involved in McKinley was that owed by a landowner 
to pedestrians using a public sidewalk abutting the property. The Court ruled: 
Certainly Fanning, who was the owner of the entire premises, lessor of the 
cafe and apparently the possessor of the hotel. had a duty to pedestrians 
using the public sidewalk to exercise reasonable care not to create a 
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dangerous condition on the sidewalk. Fanning had a further duty to remedy 
any dangerous condition vvhich his alterations of the property had caused if 
it jeopardized safe passage on the public sidewalk. 
at 19 l. Additionally in !!arrison v. Taylor, this Court stated: 
In addition to the duty of ordinary care we recognize today for owners and 
occupiers of land toward their invitees, there is an additional basis for 
reversing the ruling of the trial court here. Either a tenant, or a landlord, or 
both, may be liable to a third pai1y for injuries resulting from negligent 
repairs or failure to repair. Even in the absence of a specific lease provision, 
and with no controlling statute requiring him to make repairs, if a landlord 
voluntarily unde11akes repairs he is bound to use reasonable and ordinary 
care or skill in the execution of the work. 49 Am.Jur.2d § 795, p. 746 (see 
cases cited therein). Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control of the 
premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, 
and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of 
the premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for 
failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Harrison 115 Idaho 588 at 596, citing 49 Am.Jur.2d § 981, p. 980 (see cases cited therein); 
accord, Torres v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 93 N.M. 408,410,600 P.2d 1198, 
1200 ( 1979). 
Harrison thus established that in the case of an active landlord who undertakes a 
repair on a leased or rented property, even in the absence of a specific lease provision, or 
statutory duty, may be held liable if the repair is performed in a negligent manner. The 
duty of care, as set forth in McKinley is one of reasonable care. 
The Harrison decision was also positively referenced by the Idaho Court of Appeals 
in Robinson v. Mueller, The Court of Appeals ruled "the landlord owes a duty only to the 
extent that, if the landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must 
exercise reasonable care in performing such repairs." Robinson 156 ldaho 237,241. 
Finally, as cited above, in 1968 this Court ruled that every person has a general duty 
to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set 
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in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such 
(Citations omitted.) FVhitt, 91 Idaho 181, at 188. 
As Stiles pointed out at summary judgment, and as supported by the facts section 
above, it was Amundson who decided to move the bay window. Amundson additionally 
testified under oath that he exercised complete authority, discretion, and control over any 
repair or maintenance conducted on the property, including the window removal. 
Amundson and Roger, under Amundson's direction, discretion, authority and control 
removed the bay window, placing it in a walkway which was utilized by guests to enter 
and exit the property's backyard during the night. Amundson then later listed the window 
for sale on Craigslist. 
Storage of the 4' x 8', 200-pound window was ancillary to the window removal 
project. Once Amundson removed the window, and placed in its initial location, a 
dangerous condition was created on the property. Thereafter, Amundson failed to follow 
up on the status of the window, even though he had placed the window for sale on 
Craigslist. The storage of the window which caused of Stiles' injuries is a direct result of 
the project initiated by Amundson. Amundson breached his duty to Stiles by placing the 
window in the walkway, and failing to follow up once the window's pane was shattered, 
and the window itself was moved further up the alleyway. Accordingly, Amundson's 
failure to place the window in a safe location, or assure the window was placed in a safe 
location, was a breach of his duty of reasonable care. The issues surrounding the foregoing 
material facts associated with Amundson' s negligent repair are in dispute, and according 
to the summary judgment standard should be submitted to a jury. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Based on foregoing arguments and authorities, this should reverse the 
decision of the District Court in granting summary judgment. Amundson owed Stiles a 
duty of ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances of this case and breached that 
duty. Genuine issues of material fact exist for both propositions which precluded the entry 
of summary judgment. Alternatively, Amundson breached his duty to warn Stiles of a 
dangerous condition he knew or should have known to exist on the land. Amundson had 
a further duty both of reasonable care as well as to warn Stiles due to the negligent repair 
of the window on the property and having been on the property two to three days prior to 
the date ofloss. Accordingly, the District Court's decision granting summary judgment in 
favor of Amundson should be vacated and the dismissal of the case reversed. The case sub 
Judice should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED: This /? tt-y of October, 2015. 
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